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Assessment of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and the 
Necessity of a Deeper Collaboration with the Social 
Sciences for Racial Equality 
 
Carta H. Robison* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Author and journalist Hunter S. Thompson once 
wrote, “I’m a relatively respectable citizen a multiple, 
felon, perhaps, but certainly not dangerous.”1 Anglo-
American jurisprudence presents a very unique set of 
procedural rules, many codified through common law, 
which have guided our American legal system for several 
decades.2 The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 
1975.3 They apply to actions, cases, and proceedings 
brought after the Rules took effect.4 The purpose of these 
Rules is to “administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the 
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining 
the truth and securing a just determination.”5 Consistent 
with this provision, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
mandate that all relevant evidence is admissible unless 
the Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence themselves, or any other rule prescribed by the 
Supreme Court provide otherwise.6 
Challengingly, however, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence reflect two principalistic issues that do not 
always live in accord in the criminal context.7 Through 
                                               
* The author completed her juris doctor degree from Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law. She thanks her parents for their support and 
encouragement, Professor Victor D. Quintanilla for opening her eyes to the 
realities of “access to justice” in the American legal system, and her 
colleagues on the INDIANA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY for their fine 
editing and comments on this article. All correspondence about this article 
should be directed to her at cartarobison@gmail.com. 
1 HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY 
TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM, 74 (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1998). 
2 See generally Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining 
and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255 (1984) 
(discussing codification of the law of evidence). 
3 Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
4 FED. R. EVID. 101. 
5 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
6 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
7 See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635 (2003) (discussing the 
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the most foundational of principles in our jurisprudence 
system, the Accused is innocent until proven guilty in 
criminal prosecutions. This is known as the “presumption 
of innocence” and exists today under our common-law 
legal system.8 The text of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides several 
guarantees to the Accused, including the right to a speedy 
and public trial in front of an impartial jury, to be 
informed of the accusation against him, to confront the 
witnesses against him, and to call witnesses in his favor.9 
Because the Accused possesses this inherent presumption 
of innocence, the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each essential element of the crime 
charged. The notion, in theory, is that we base our 
criminal-justice system on the precept that a person will 
be convicted only for what he does, not for who he is or for 
what he has done prior to the event in question.10  
One hallmark rule of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
has codified this notion with particularity: that evidence 
of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible 
to prove that at a given time the person acted in 
accordance with that character.11 Character, in this sense, 
is roughly the equivalent of what people think the kind of 
person someone is; it is “a fixed trait or the sum of 
traits.”12 This is known as character propensity, and 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 prohibits use of such 
evidence. Therefore, on one hand, the rules are designed 
to provide relevant information to the trier of fact (judge 
or jury), but through rules such as Rule 404 and its 
propensity ban, certain information may be limited when 
it is likely to be given too much weight by the trier of 
fact.13 
                                               
inconsistencies between Rules 609 and 608(b) and their respective 
impeachment methods and the disparities that result in their application). 
8 See generally François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in 
the French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
107(2010) (discussing the development of the presumption of innocence 
doctrine in both the French and Anglo-American traditions). 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
10 H. Richard Uvillers, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, 
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982). 
11 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
12 IA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 55, ILL. L. REV. (Tillers 
Rev. 1983).  
13 Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal 
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 534 (1992).  
 
2019]           Assessment of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 314 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 is known to be the 
most controversial of all the rules.14 Many scholars in 
opposition of the rule have suggested that there be more 
restrictions on use of a defendant’s criminal convictions to 
impeach a defendant’s credibility.15 Social-science 
research has enhanced support for the fact that 
admissibility of prior bad acts can significantly prejudice 
the defendant. Furthermore, there is more room for social 
science and critical race theory to play a role in legal 
policy assessment and in the development of policy to 
reflect the status of racism in the American jurisprudence 
system than has been accepted.  
Triers of fact apply Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 
609 under the assumption that the rule is neutral. This 
Note  will explain that the rule is not neutral and should 
be reviewed to account for the racial inequality in the 
criminal justice system: Black men face more criminal 
convictions than any other demographic.16 More 
specifically, this note links critical race theory, social 
science methods, and the law, to intervene and address 
how the use of Rule 609 disproportionately affects people 
of color. Rule 609 permits exposure of a witness’s prior 
conviction when those convictions are the result of being 
swept into a system that is biased towards them. A 
stricter scrutiny of the reliability of the prior conviction as 
a result of systemic racism must be acknowledged.17 A 
collaboration with social science is the best intervention. 
                                               
14 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts 
Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 295 (2008); Teree E. Foster, 609(a) in the Civil 
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1988) 
(noting the commentary around 609 as challenging and profuse); Victor Gold, 
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of 
Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2295 (1994) (noting that no Federal Rule 
of Evidence has sparked more controversy than Rule 609). 
15 Okun, supra note 13, at 536. 
16 Despite the recommendation of The Chicago Manual of Style, I have 
intentionally capitalized the “b” in Black. Historically, “Black” constitutes a 
group which includes African-Americans and those who are of African 
descent but not from the United States. Capitalizing “Black” is also the 
accepted standard used by Black media outlets and shows respect for the 
necessary distinction between color and race. For additional commentary, see 
Lori L. Tharps, Opinion, The Case for Black with a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-
black-with-a-capital-b.html?_r=0. 
17 Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 
565 (2014). 
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This Note proposes that a stricter focus on 
behavioral realism in the law will take into account the 
scientific findings of bias and systemic racism and use 
them to understand how people’s (including judges’) 
subconscious biases affect their behavior in the operation 
of Rule 609. With this information, lawmakers can craft 
policies to address current discrimination and reform the 
rules beginning with Rule 609. Ultimately, this Note will 
show that Rule 609, as it stands today, re-manifests 
discrimination in the justice system whereby the prior 
conviction helps convict the defendant again, and that 
social science should be applied more forcefully to show 
that bias plays a major role in perpetuating racism in the 
law. As the most controversial of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 609 is best suited to lead the charge for 
criminal-justice reform. Application of Rule 609 severely 
prejudices the defendant-witness.  The legal system 
should be accountable for approaches in the law that have 
been invalidated by the social sciences. This article calls 
for implementation of a federal interdisciplinary task 
force to follow the model proposed by Jerry Kang: 
deconstruct Rule 609, apply behavior realism, and reform 
the law to reflect scientific findings.18 
 
I. THE HISTORICAL AND RACIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RULE 609 
 
There have been several iterations and 
reconstructions of what is now Rule 609 since 1970.19 In 
1965, the courts initiated complete judicial discretion and 
balancing tests where the judge could use her discretion 
to weigh the probative value of the conviction against the 
issue of the witness’s credibility.20 This was short lived, 
however, because by 1970 Congress rejected the balancing 
test when it amended the District of Columbia Code to 
mandate the admissibility of a felony conviction for any 
                                               
18 See Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism 
about Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 635–36 (2015) (arguing that the 
commitment to behavioral realism is a three-step process: step one, identify 
new science; step 2, excavate old law; and step 3, account for the gap). 
19 See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 271 (1973). 
20 See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d. 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that trial 
courts should employ a balancing test to determine whether to admit prior 
convictions in order to impeach a witness). 
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crime involving dishonesty or a false statement.21 
Congress’s desire to use prior convictions against a 
witness was taking a strong hold, and judges were quickly 
becoming restricted in the discretion they could use.22 The 
Rule 609 of today is a product of this amendment to the 
D.C. Code. It was a bargain between two conflicting draft 
versions of the rule produced by both the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees in 1975.23  Each version 
varied drastically.24 The Conference Committee was 
tasked with reconciling the two versions.25 While Rule 609 
was an attempt to strike a balance between the necessity 
of prior-conviction evidence and the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial, it became clear that those who favored greater 
admission of prior-conviction evidence got the better end 
of the compromise.26 
The crux of Rule 609 is as follows: once the 
defendant-witness takes the stand, he opens himself up to 
impeachment for credibility by the prosecutor, who may 
(and often will) introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior 
convictions.27 Rule 609 is only triggered when there is a 
conviction and the defendant-witness takes the stand.28 
The rule’s design encompasses two parts. The first, and 
most straightforward part, is Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(2), which seeks to admit conviction evidence for 
crimes involving dishonesty or a false statement (e.g. 
perjury, tax evasion, forgery, embezzlement).29 If such a 
conviction exists, and the conviction was in the last ten 
                                               
21 Okun, supra note 13, at 541 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 14–305(b)(1) (1980)) 
(“For the purpose of attacking credibility of a witness, evidence that the 
witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted . . . if the 
criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved 
dishonesty or a false statement regardless of punishment.”). 
22 See Alan D. Hornstein, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to 
Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997); see 
also Gold, supra note 14, at 2299 (discussing the history of Rule 609 and 
criticism around the Preliminary Draft’s absence of any discretion to exclude 
the threat of prejudice in a criminal case). 
23 Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A 
Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. 
REV. 1, 10 (1999). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See Edward Roslak, Game Over: A Proposal to Reform Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609, 39 SETON HALL L. REV., 695, 716 (2009). 
28 Id.  at 695. 
29 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
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years, then it must automatically be admitted.30 This also 
means that the judge exercises no discretion on whether 
such evidence should be admitted, and its admission is 
not subject to the Rule 403 balancing.31 The thought is 
that because these convictions involve “dishonestly or 
false statements” they are highly probative of untruthful 
character.32 The rule does not distinguish between 
felonies or misdemeanors.33  
The second part, Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(1), is slightly more complex and involves evidence 
for crimes punishable for more than one year that do not 
involve a false statement or dishonesty. In other words, 
Rule 609(a)(1) admits other serious crimes through one of 
two balancing tests. Rule 609(a)(1)(A) indicates that 
evidence must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil 
or criminal case where the witness was not the 
defendant.34 Rule 609(a)(1)(B) states that evidence must 
be admitted where the witness was also the defendant if 
the probative value outweighs prejudicial effect.35 Finally, 
Rule 609(b) caps the look-back period of a conviction at 
ten years.36 After ten years, the law favors exclusion of 
the evidence. If more than ten years have passed from a 
witness’s conviction or release (whichever is later) and the 
impeachment would be otherwise admissible under Rule 
                                               
30 See id.; Gold, supra note 14, at 2319. 
31 See FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 is a balancing test for judges to determine 
whether the evidence introduced has probative value. If the evidence passes 
Rule 401’s relevancy standard then the judge determines whether the 
evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of one of 
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
When that probative value is outweighed, the judge may exclude the 
evidence; see also Gold, supra note 14, at 2319 (describing that evidence 
admitted under (a)(2) is not subject to exclusion, even where prejudicial effect 
outweighs probative value). 
32 Gold, supra note 14, at 2319-2320. 
33 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (noting that the rule applies to any crime 
regardless of the punishment). 
34 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A). 
35 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). This is a modified (reverse) version of Rule 403 
where the law favors exclusion: the probative value of the evidence must 
outweigh the prejudicial effect to the defendant. This balancing test is 
designed to account for the prejudice the criminal defendant faces when the 
jury learns of such conviction. For all other witnesses, the original Rule 403 
balance applies and favors inclusion of evidence.  
36 See FED. R. EVID. 609(b). This subdivision applies if more than 10 years 
have passed since the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it, 
whichever is greater. 
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609(a), then an extremely strong showing of probative 
value is required to admit conviction evidence.37 
Admitting evidence to the trier of fact that could be 
attributed too much weight is dangerous for several 
reasons. To start, it is important to first note why the 
Federal Rules of Evidence exist in the first place. Some 
scholars have posited that juries are the reason why such 
extensive rules exist.38 The problem with juries is 
illustrated through the concept of “mental contamination” 
and it comes up frequently in evidence law.39 Juries are 
lay people, not legal scholars, and they bear the heavy 
burden of sifting through a lot of information and 
deciding, based on the facts presented in the case, 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crimes 
charged. But mental contamination represents a category 
of research findings about how juries use prior knowledge 
(and bias) in an unwanted manner.40 From the start, the 
judge must be the gatekeeper of the flow of evidence and 
information presented to the jury to reduce the bias and 
prejudice that the jury may exert against the defendant. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, discussed previously, is one 
such rule that requires the judge to make swift 
determinations on how the jury will be affected by 
admission of the information.41 Human behavior indicates 
that people rely on character and the assumption is that 
people behave according to their personality or 
character.42 
Character or a character trait is normally proven 
by one of three available means: reputation, specific 
manifestation, and sometimes opinion.43 Culturally, most 
Americans assume that one’s personality (or “character”) 
has a strong bearing on one’s propensity to behave in a 
certain way towards others.44 In other words, Americans 
like to believe that if they understand a person’s 
                                               
37 See FED. R. EVID. 609(b)(1); see also Rule of Evidence for United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 271 (1973) (stating that “practical 
considerations of fairness and relevancy demand that some boundary be 
recognized”). 
38 See MICHAEL J. SAKS & BARBARA A. SPELLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 2 (2016). 
39 Id. at 19. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 57. 
42 Id. at 142. 
43 Uvillers, supra note 10, at 849. 
44SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 142. 
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personality traits, then it may be easier to predict that 
person’s behavior on a given occasion. The question then 
becomes: under this assumption, is it proper for the law to 
exclude evidence of a person’s character to determine 
whether a criminal defendant is more or less likely to 
have committed the crime charged? The response of the 
common law is “yes and no.”45 The American criminal-
justice system has developed to exclude evidence of a 
person’s character to prove that a defendant has a 
propensity to commit crime.46 By contrast, there is no 
prohibition on use of prior-conviction evidence to impeach 
a defendant’s credibility as a witness.47  
Second, character evidence is generally excluded 
because it is of slight probative value.48 Character 
evidence is thought to be time consuming and 
distracting.49 At worst, as the Advisory Committee Notes 
to Rule 404 note, character evidence is very prejudicial: it 
“distracts the trier of fact from the main question of what 
actually happened on the particular occasion” and 
“punish[es] the bad man . . . despite what the evidence in 
the case shows actually happened.”50 On a psychological 
level, jurors misuse negative character evidence.51 
Further, when character is introduced, and the 
prosecution is able to probe into specific instances of the 
witness’s character, the jury is more likely to find the 
defendant guilty “when positive character evidence is 
rebutted than when character evidence is not introduced 
at all.”52 Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence were 
established to restrain lawyers from presenting unreliable 
evidence that would confuse, mislead, deceive the jury, or 
                                               
45 Uvillers, supra note 10, at 849. 
46 FED. R. EVID. 404. 
47 See generally, FED. R. EVID. 609. 
48 Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
219 (1973). 
49 See id; see also Uvillers, supra note 10, at 850. 
50 Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
219 (1973). 
51 See Evelyn M. Mader & Jennifer S. Hunt, Talking About a Black Man: The 
Influence of Defendant and Character Witness Race on Jurors’ Use of 
Character Evidence, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 608, 609 (2011) (analyzing studies that 
found that jurors are more influenced by specific negative information from 
the prosecution’s cross examination than the general positive character 
evidence introduced by the defense).  
52 Id. at 610. 
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be too prejudicial to a criminal defendant.53 The law 
assumes that people do not dependably behave in 
accordance with their personalities, so as a general rule 
character evidence is excluded.54  
The lines of character evidence begin to blur as the 
litigious evidence battle continues with the complexity of 
rules such as Rule 609. Rule 609 is an exception to Rule 
404’s ban against character evidence.55 Courts allow 
character evidence under certain circumstances and for 
certain purposes.56 But, as is the case for Rule 609, once 
prior-conviction evidence is admitted, the jury cannot 
unhear it. Prior-conviction evidence is still used even 
though there is an overwhelming body of data that 
concludes that jurors outright misuse prior-conviction 
evidence.57 The jurors draw impermissible inferences—so 
much so that Rule 609 creates an entirely opposite 
effect!58 It has been proven that jurors cannot manage 
evidence of a person’s prior convictions: they use prior-
conviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and 
frequently ignore or fail to understand limiting 
instructions.59 The drafters made two very large 
assumptions: 1) that jurors are able to understand a 
judge’s limiting instruction when prior-conviction 
evidence is introduced; and 2) that jurors will obey the 
instruction.60 Thus, in theory, the rules were designed to 
help jurors by limiting the amount of prejudicial evidence 
that is presented, but instead the rules allow introduction 
of evidence that the jury cannot objectively handle. 
Coupled with other psychological processes, such as 
implicit bias and stereotyping, “[w]hite jurors are more 
likely to experience anger and less likely to report 
empathy toward the defendant,” seeing them as vicious 
                                               
53 T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 501 
(1999). 
54 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 143; see generally FED. R. EVID. 404. 
55 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3). Evidence of a witness’s character may be 
admissible under Rules 607, 608, and 609. Emphasis added. 
56 Id. 
57 Dodson, supra note 23, at 42. 
58 See id. at 32 (discussing one of the first relevant studies regarding jurors 
and limiting instructions). 
59 Id. at 39 (“[T]he defendant’s criminal record does not affect the defendant’s 
credibility, but does increase the likelihood of conviction, and the judge’s 
limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error.”). 
60 Id. at 31. 
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and dangerous.61 Under Rule 609, this level of prejudice 
leads to re-conviction and increases racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system.62  
Psychology and evidence law enjoy a unique 
intersection because psychological rationales have been 
presented in support of many of the rules seen today. 
Naturally, the story of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
begins with rulemakers, those who design and continue to 
shape the rules. At one point, rulemakers were common-
law judges, but today they are legislatures, committees, 
and often judges in their role as interpreters of the 
rules.63 Within the universe of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, there are judges who apply the rules, parties to 
cases, lawyers who argue how the rules should be applied, 
witnesses, and jurors. Undergirding the application of the 
rules of evidence is, unavoidably, psychology.64 Arguably, 
the rulemakers must act as psychologists.65 The rules 
require factfinders to comprehend the meaning of 
evidence, assess its soundness, ascertain whether certain 
kinds of inquiries by counsel are likely to help illuminate 
the strengths and weaknesses of evidence, and to 
determine whether judicial instructions can provide 
guidance when confronting problematic evidence.66 In the 
end, “rulemakers must predict how a given kind of 
evidence . . . is likely to influence factfinders, steering 
them away from misleading factual conclusions and 
moving them towards correct ones.”67 Similarly, when a 
judge rules on whether to admit or exclude a piece of 
evidence, she is doing so by predicting how a jury will be 
influenced by it.68 Unfortunately, the rulemakers have 
simply gotten this wrong when it comes to Rule 609. 
                                               
61 Jennifer S. Hunt, Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Jury Decision Making, 11 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 269, 280 (2015). 
62 See Montré D. Carodine, The Mis-Characterization of the Negro: A Race 
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 550 
(2009). 
63 Cf. Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 185 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing that the Supreme Court 
is a “merely a conduit” to those who wrote the Rules and is not qualified 
enough to “apprise their merits when applied in actual practice.”)  
64 See Eilis S. Magner, Wigmore Confronts Munsterberg: Present Relevance of 
a Classic Debate, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 121, 122 (1991). 
65 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 1. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 2. 
68 See Reagan Wm. Simpson & Warren S. Huang, Procedural Rules 
Governing the Admissibility of Evidence, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 513, 521 (2001). 
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 The premises on which many of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence are constructed are largely a product of the 
rulemakers’ perceptions and beliefs about human 
psychology: how people receive, store, and retrieve 
information, as well as how they draw inferences.69 
Consider, for example, the evidence law concept of 
“hearsay.” Hearsay is broadly defined as an out-of-court 
statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted.70 
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because it 
is like offering secondhand testimony without the 
statement’s declarant in court to attest to its truth.71 
Remarkably, a savvy lawyer may be able to admit such a 
statement under the nearly thirty exceptions to the 
hearsay rule.72 For example, under Rule 803(2), an out-of-
court statement offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted may be admissible when the statement is made 
under the influence of a stressful event.73 Rule 803(2) is 
known as the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay 
rule.74 It is rooted in the belief that people have limited 
cognitive capacity and that the stress of an arousing event 
creates so much excitement that people lack sufficient 
capacity of reflection to create falsehoods.75 This rule, 
grounded in cognitive theory, dates back to the early 
twentieth-century and was accepted as sound by 
American judges and later the drafters of the Federal 
Rules.76 Therefore, if rulemakers and judges are using 
these social beliefs, we must then inquire whether these 
                                               
69 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 2. 
70 “‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while 
testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801. 
71 Consider this simplified example: A witness says, “I heard Mr. Jones say 
that the defendant killed Mr. Smith.” That is a hearsay statement.  If Mr. 
Jones is not in the courtroom, he is not observable by the jury and 
unavailable by the defense for cross examination. Hearsay is generally 
excluded to support the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against 
him and to keep unreliable and unverified statements at bay. See Adam 
Freedman, What is Hearsay?, QUICK AND DIRTY TIPS (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://www.quickanddirtytips.com/business-career/legal/what-hearsay. 
72 See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24).  These subdivisions are not excluded by the 
rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a 
witness. 
73 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
74 Id. 
75 See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 303 (1973). 
76 See Alan G. Williams, Abolishing the Excited Utterance Exception to the 
Rule Against Hearsay, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 717, 724 n.29 (2015). 
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beliefs are correct, thereby rendering the rules fair and 
most effective to administering every proceeding fairly.77  
Rule 609 is a rule for impeachment purposes and 
uses a witness’s prior conviction as evidence that the 
witness is unreliable.78 Impeachment evidence is 
“evidence that may be used to impeach a witness because 
it tends to harm the witness’s credibility.”79 Anyone who 
takes the stand can be subject to impeachment.80 By 
contrast to the cognitive theory of the “excited utterance” 
hearsay exception, Rule 609 theory is that a person who 
has been convicted of a crime can be inferred to have a 
character for untruthfulness, and the factfinder is 
welcome to infer that such a person might be lying on the 
witness stand when he testifies.81 The law once 
considered criminal defendants to be the “most likely liars 
of all”82 and excluded them entirely from testifying. 
Today, Rule 609 asserts that someone convicted has a 
blemished record and therefore is less credible than 
someone with no criminal record at all. In other words, 
Rule 609 asserts that if the defendant was so antisocial to 
have been convicted of a crime previously, it is probative 
of his willingness to give false testimony on the stand 
today.83 Theoretically, the evidence of a person’s prior 
conviction is necessary because the jury deserves to know 
whether the witness is an upstanding citizen and worthy 
of belief.84 So, the evidence of a person’s prior conviction is 
outside of Rule 404’s propensity ban. Instead, when 
evidence of the witness’s prior conviction is introduced, 
the jury is expected to psychologically exclude it for use as 
character propensity (to determine whether the defendant 
acted according to his character on a particular occassion) 
                                               
77 See generally FED. R. EVID. 102 (discussing the rule’s purpose). 
78 A witness could be called to testify on behalf of the Accused or be the 
Accused himself. When the Accused testifies on his behalf he is known as the 
witness-defendant. This paper focuses on the experiences of the witness-
defendant. 
79 Impeachment evidence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF LAW (Updated 
ed. 2011). 
80 FED. R. EVID. 607 (“Any party, including the party who called the witness, 
may attack the witness’s credibility.”). 
81 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 169. 
82 George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 662 
(2006). 
83 GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: 
RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY, AND AUTHORITY 378 (LexisNexis 
7th ed. 2012).  
84 See Gold, supra note 14, at 2298. 
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and use that evidence for its proper purpose (to determine 
witness credibility). 
The problem with this theory is that it ignores the 
twin problems of juror misuse of evidence and implicit 
bias. Rule 609’s policy assumes that the law today 
coexists in a post-racial and beyond-race society.85 History 
tells us this is simply not true. At common law, a felon 
was deemed incompetent to testify as a witness.86 The 
idea was that the felon, in addition to being punished for 
the crime committed, was disqualified from testifying 
because felons were “unworthy of belief.”87 Today, felons 
may not be automatically disqualified from testifying, but 
if they so choose to testify, they may be impeached when 
the prosecutor introduces evidence of their prior 
conviction.88 Indeed, it matters that the law has evolved 
beyond the original blanket disqualification under the 
common law.  
In the United States, race has always been used as 
predictive character evidence. As one scholar has so 
strikingly noted: race is evidence.89 American slavery and 
the segregation of Blacks from whites made clear that 
one’s race was  the sole determining factor for one’s place 
in society. During the slavery era, when a person was 
evidently Black, it was reasonable to legally assume they 
were a slave—skin color had probative value.90 
Additionally, being Black bore the presumption of bad 
character when race determined the severity of penalties 
that Blacks received in the criminal justice system.91 
Certain crimes were designated as capital offenses if the 
defendant was Black,92 and race could be used to 
determine intent if the defendant was Black in rape 
prosecutions after the Civil War.93 Additionally, under the 
United States slave codes and competency requirements, 
                                               
85 See Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets 
Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 149, 151 (2014). 
86 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989). 
87 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
88 Okun, supra note 13, at 538 (citing Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 
(1917) (holding common law rule disqualifying convicted felons from 
testifying is inapplicable for determining witness competency)). 
89 Carodine, supra note 62, at 528. 
90 Id. at 531. 
91 Id. 
92 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 
1945, 1955 (1993). 
93 Carodine, supra note 62, at 532. 
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Blacks were not able to testify against whites.94 The 
ability of Blacks to testify is also directly correlated to 
their ability to sit on juries.95 Congress first addressed the 
issue of allowing Blacks the right to serve on juries in 
1867.96 Proponents of that bill believed that the right to 
serve as a juror was a natural evolution in the process for 
newly freed men; opponents believed that Blacks did not 
possess the ability to try cases fairly and accurately.97  
To reinforce the stereotypes that Blacks are inferior 
to whites, slave owners and legislators stimulated 
misconceptions that Blacks, especially Black men, are 
lazy, violent, and ignorant.98 Rule 401 states that 
evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the 
action.”99 Plainly, does the evidence have any tendency to 
make the fact more or less likely than it would without 
the evidence? It is a loose, porous standard. That someone 
is of a particular race should not make it more or less 
likely that they committed the crime charged or will be 
untruthful upon testifying.100 Race evidence, while 
inadmissible, still seeps in to the jury decision making 
process via Rule 609. Historically, race had and has 
evidentiary value and relevance because it is used to 
make the determination that an act did occur simply 
because the actor is Black.101 
 
II. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PARTNERSHIP 
 
The stereotypes about Black males that dominate 
American culture naturally find their way into the 
courtroom. Proponents of post-racialism point to the 
election of Barack Obama, the country’s first Black 
president, to advance the argument that race is no longer 
                                               
94 James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE 
L.J. 895, 910 (2004). 
95 Id. at 912. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 912–13. 
98 Carodine, supra note 62, at 532. 
99 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
100 Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2264 (2017).  
101 Carodine, supra note 62, at 531. 
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salient to social analysis.102 But there exists a disparity 
that too often is left unaddressed: a post-racial society 
still exists when Blacks are disproportionately more 
incarcerated than any other demographic of people.103 
Even though America had a Black president, race still 
matters.104 Critical Race Theory (CRT) has developed out 
of legal scholarship and focuses on critically analyzing 
race and racism from a legal point of view.105 Emerging in 
the 1980s, CRT has become one of the fastest growing and 
most controversial movements in recent legal 
scholarship.106 CRT can be summarized as addressing 
how assumptions about race affect the players within the 
legal system and have a determining effect on substantive 
legal doctrines.107 CRT rests on ten “commitments” or 
themes, which are outlined as follows: 
1. Race inequality is hardwired into the fabric 
of our social and economic landscape. 
2. Because racism exists at both the 
subconscious and conscious levels, the 
elimination of intentional racism would not 
eliminate racial inequality. 
3. Racism intersects with other forms of 
inequality, such as classism, sexism, and 
homophobia. 
4. Our racial past exerts contemporary effects. 
5. Racial change occurs when the interests of 
white elites converge with the interests of 
the racially disempowered. 
6. Race is a social construction whose meanings 
and effects are contingent and change over 
time. 
7. The concept of color blindness in law and 
social policy and the argument for ostensibly 
                                               
102 See Carbado & Roithmayr, supra note 85, at 152. 
103 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2010) (“[I]n major cities wracked by the drug 
war, as many as eighty  percent of young African American men now have 
criminal records and are thus subject to legalized discrimination for the rest 
of their lives.”). 
104 See Carodine, supra note 62, at 523. 
105 What is Critical Race Theory?, UCLA SCH. PUB. AFF. BLOG, 
https://spacrs.wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/ (last visited Jan. 1, 
2018). 
106 Douglas E. Litowitz, Some Critical Thoughts on Critical Race Theory, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503 (1997). 
107 Id. at 503–04. 
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race-neutral practices often serve to 
undermine the interests of people of color. 
8. Immigration laws that restrict Asian and 
Mexican entry into the United States 
regulate the racial makeup of the nation and 
perpetuate the view that people of Asian and 
Latino descent are foreigners.  
9. Racial stereotypes are ubiquitous in society 
and limit the opportunities of people of color. 
10. The success of various policy initiatives often 
depends on whether the perceived 
beneficiaries are people of color.108 
 
These commitments and the work of CRT scholars 
demonstrate that American society is not “post-racial.” 
CRT has been praised for its ability to consider multiple 
perspectives in legal scholarship, and its ability to bring 
to light the everyday acts of racism that are extremely 
subtle and difficult to regulate by law.109 CRT is also 
highly regarded for incorporating and giving a voice to 
those who are underrepresented and experience injustice 
in the legal system: minorities, women, criminals, the 
poor, and jurors.110 Likewise, “Human Centered Civil 
Justice is rooted in human experience, needs, beliefs, 
concerns and the adversities that people encounter in the 
everyday.”111 To better understand how members of the 
public encounter and experience the civil justice system, 
“civil justice designers draw on psychological science 
concerning both procedural justice and distributive 
justice.”112  
One example of how the public experiences the 
justice system is through over-policing of Black 
communities. Racial bias is partly responsible for why 
Blacks are treated more harshly than whites and 
contributes to why Black males have greater interaction 
with law enforcement. However, racial bias has not 
always been linked to treating individuals as if they are 
                                               
108 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 151. 
109 Litowitz, supra note 106, at 510. 
110 Id. at 511. 
111 Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civil Justice Design, 121 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 745, 772 (2017).  
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older than they are.113 In a study on the police and racial 
bias, Dr. Philip Goff showed that white police officers are 
more likely to use force against Black children when 
officers dehumanize Blacks.114 Dr. Goff and his colleagues 
explored the possibility that “if human childhood affords 
strong protections against harsh, adult-like treatment, 
then in contexts where children are dehumanized, those 
children can be treated with adult severity.”115 In one of 
four studies to test previously established hypotheses, 
Goff tested 60 police officers116, mostly white males with 
an average age of thirty-eight, to determine whether 
dehumanization of Blacks leads to worse outcomes in the 
criminal justice system.117 First, officers were given a 
“dehumanization” implicit association test (IAT) to 
measure the form of their implicit bias against Blacks 
consisting of Black/White, ape/great cat pairings.118 
Afterwards, the officers were presented with 12 scenarios 
depicting male targets of a given race (White, Black or 
Latino) as criminal suspects.119 Researchers then 
reviewed the police officers’ personnel files to determine 
when these officers used force while on duty.120 After 
adding weights to each “incident” of force based on its 
severity121, results revealed that officers overestimated 
the age of Black felony suspects more than that of Black 
misdemeanor suspects, as well as all other suspects.122 
The police officers who dehumanized Blacks (associated 
Blacks with apes) were more likely to have used force 
against a Black child than those officers who did not 
dehumanize Blacks.123 White children were not subject to 
                                               
113 Phillip Atiba Goff, Matthew Jackson, Brooke Di Leone, Carmen Culotta & 
Natalie DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 526 (2014). 
114 Id. at 527. 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 535. After the shocking results of this study, Dr. Goff sought to 
replicate the field component with a larger sample. The results were virtually 
the same. 
117 Id. at 533. 
118 Id. at 531. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. Researchers multiplied each incident by a number representing the 
severity of the force used. Wrist locks were multiplied by 1, punching 2, and 
so on up to 8 for the use of deadly force. 
122 Id.  at 534. 
123 Id.  at 535. 
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this overestimation.124 Further, the research from this 
study indicated that only dehumanization, not prejudice 
against Blacks, was linked to violent encounters with 
Black children.125 The next logical question is what causes 
white police officers to dehumanize Black children?  
Perception matters with age and culpability. Dr. 
Goff also determined that there is a reduction in 
perceiving Black children as the children they are.126 
Overestimating age and culpability based on racial 
differences was linked to the dehumanizing stereotypes 
found in the first portion of the study.127 In another study 
involving participants outside the criminal-justice 
context, a group of undergraduate students consisting of 
mostly white females were asked to rate innocence from 
photos of children in infancy through age twenty-five.128 
Beginning at age ten, Black children were rated 
significantly less innocent than white children and their 
ages were overestimated by an average of four-and-a-half 
years.129 Dr. Goff’s work is just one example of scientific 
evidence of racial disparities, but his evidence clearly 
shows that perception of child innocence can be affected 
by race. For Black children, this can mean that they lose 
assumed childhood innocence well before they become 
adults.130 The research from this study indicates that 
Black children are more likely to be perceived as 
dangerous, aggressive, and less innocent “at an age when 
white boys still benefit from the presumption that 
children are essentially innocent.”131 When Black children 
are considered older (by four-and-a-half years) and more 
culpable than they are in reality, a mere thirteen-year-old 
child is perceived to be an adult. More importantly, Black 
males have more encounters with police earlier in life 
than their white counterparts.132 
                                               
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 532. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 529. 
129 Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Black Boys Viewed as Older, Less 
Innocent than Whites, Research Finds (Mar. 6, 2014) 
(https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/03/black-boys-older.aspx).  
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 See generally Radley Balko, Opinion, There’s overwhelming evidence that 
the criminal-justice system is racist. Here’s the proof., WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-
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In terms of minorities and Rule 609, the problem is 
not simply that crime has been racialized (when we think 
of crime, we have Blacks in mind); it is also that race is 
criminalized (when we think of Blacks, we have crime in 
mind).133 Researchers have concluded that blackness 
essentially primes us to think about crime, and in turn, 
crime primes us to pay close attention to Black people.134 
As seen in the studies conducted by Dr. Goff, crime has 
been racialized for Black youth who have more exposure 
to the criminal system than other demographics. 
Therefore, if the prototypical criminal is a Black person 
and Black identity has become associated with 
criminality, it follows that racial suspicion shapes 
behavior in the world: whether it be the behavior of law 
enforcement, decision-making juries, or policy-making 
legislators.135 Recall that the theory underlying Rule 609 
is that a jury might be misled to think the defendant is 
trustworthy without Rule 609 as an impeachment 
method. Rule 609 assumes that in addition to whatever 
else law breaking may tell the court about a witness, it 
reveals that the witness has a substantially increased 
likelihood of telling lies.136 The misperception problem 
with prior convictions works in the opposite direction with 
white defendants and witnesses as well. “If a White 
defendant or a White witness does not have a prior record, 
the jury will assume that person has led an honorable life 
and is worthy of belief.”137 “White credit”138 in the 
criminal-justice system works favorably for white 
defendants who will likely be viewed differently from a 
Black defendant who has had numerous run-ins with the 
law.139 
                                               
overwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-
proof/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b557235ced8b (discussing and providing 
information from several studies regarding racial injustice such as over 
policing of minority communities). 
133 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 152. 
134 Id. (“[S]eeing blackness makes a participant more attuned to 
criminality.”). 
135 Id. at 153. 
136 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168. 
137 Carodine, supra note 62, at 560. 
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 What begins to happen next in the courtroom, 
underscoring blackness as criminal, is that Black criminal 
defendants become subject to use of their prior convictions 
as character propensity. In other words, instead of the 
jury using the prior conviction to assist them exclusively 
in assessing credibility, jurors often draw the inference 
that a person who commits a crime has a criminal 
character and is therefore more likely to be guilty of the 
crime charged.140 As has already been discussed, 
character evidence is generally inadmissible.141 But when 
jurors look at a Black defendant and rely on their 
available heuristics (mental shortcuts that help people 
make mental assessments), race comes to mind.142 
Further, popular discourse makes it easier for people to 
retrieve examples of African Americans as criminals.143 It 
is for these reasons that defendants with prior convictions 
will often not take the stand. Rule 609 can only be 
triggered if the witness takes the stand; if there is no 
witness, then impeachment cannot be satisfied.144 Rule 
609 creates substantial risk for the defendant to take the 
stand on his own behalf if he has prior convictions that 
the prosecution could introduce to the jury.145 Moreover, 
the jury may still draw a negative inference from a 
defendant’s silence.146 Sadly, a large number of factually 
innocent defendants with prior convictions have sat 
silently through trial before being found guilty.147 
 As discussed, it has become quite doubtful that 
jurors are able to restrict their use of prior conviction 
evidence to assess a witness’s credibility only. To 
undercut this challenging psychological process, courts 
may even instruct jurors to use the evidence solely to 
evaluate credibility.148 Unfortunately, research shows 
these instructions do little to prevent jurors from walking 
down the forbidden path of using prior-crimes evidence to 
                                               
140 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168. 
141 See generally Okun, supra note 13, for a discussion and the text of FED. R. 
EVID. 404. 
142 Carbado & Roithmyr, supra note 85, at 153. 
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make inferences about the crime charged.149 The research 
in favor of excluding prior conviction evidence suggests 
that prior-conviction evidence contributes little or nothing 
to the credibility assessment of defendants who take the 
witness stand, and it creates the risk that jurors will 
draw improper propensity inferences.150 Additional 
research shows that while the American jurisprudence 
system places a great deal of trust in the job of the jury, 
the average juror does little better than chance at reliably 
detecting truth telling!151 Further, the impeachment by 
prior conviction regime fails to take account for disparities 
in law enforcement, the growing body of data on wrongful 
convictions, and the nature and dominance of plea 
bargaining—all of which challenge the theory that prior-
conviction evidence is a reliable indicator of character for 
truthfulness.152 Therefore, evidence of prior convictions 
prejudices the Accused from taking the stand in his or her 
own defense and increases the Accused’s chances of being 
convicted again.153 Rule 609 creates dangerous risks that 
improper propensity inferences will be used by the jury.154 
To make matters worse, if the Accused sees testifying as 
too risky, he will likely seek a plea bargain.155 The 
Accused’s own testimony, possibly the most viable line of 
defense, is gone. This alliance between prior conviction 
evidence and the plea bargain minimizes public reform of 
the criminal justice system and perpetuates the systemic 
racism already embedded within it.156 Defendants quickly 
lose the established presumption of innocence when they 
don’t take the stand, increasing the chances of 
reconviction without consideration of culpability.157 
                                               
149 See generally Renee McDonald Hutchins, You Can’t Handle the Truth! 
Trial Juries and Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 505 (2014); Max 
Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2557 (2008). 
150 SAKS & SPELLMAN, supra note 38, at 168. 
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Evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction should 
have one purpose: to assist in assessing credibility.158 
Even with the current version of Rule 609, courts still 
struggle to apply the rule and there is disagreement about 
which crimes are usable for this purpose.159 For example, 
under Rule 609(a)(1)(B), most circuits have settled on the 
five-prong balancing test established in the late 1960s 
from Gordon v. United States.160 Despite this test, the 
application of the factors is fraught with inconsistency 
when determining the probative value of the prior 
conviction against the prejudicial effect.161 One factor, 
“the similarity between the past crime and the crime 
charged,” is derived from early case law that regarded 
“similarity” as a factor that discouraged admissibility 
because it increased the risk that the conviction would be 
considered relevant to the defendant’s propensity to 
commit the crime charged rather than the defendant’s 
credibility.162 But some subsequent caselaw favors the 
admissibility of a similar crime.163 These “confusions” 
often do lead to admissibility of prior crimes evidence, and 
this evidence is often upheld by appellate courts further 
supporting the racial disparities of the criminal justice 
system.164   
 
III. RULE 609 PERPETUATES THE CYCLE OF RACISM IN 
THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
The consideration that Rule 609 is neutral becomes 
questionable when juxtaposed against the backdrop of 
racism and criminalization in the history of America. 
Blacks are more likely to have their cars searched, to be 
arrested for drug use, to be jailed while awaiting trial, to 
be offered a plea deal that includes prison time, to be 
excluded from juries because of their race,  to serve longer 
sentences than other ethnic groups for the same offense, 
                                               
158 See Rule of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 
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and to have their probation revoked.165 Recent statistics 
show that nearly half of inmates in state or federal 
prisons and local jails are non-Hispanic Blacks.166 In 
terms of raw numbers, there are more than two-million 
Blacks in prison or jail on any given day.167 
Commentators have offered various theories explaining 
the disproportionate number of incarcerated Blacks, 
including: the “over-policing” of Black communities, the 
War on Drugs (which unfairly targets minorities), 
prosecutorial bias, and other flaws and biases in the trial 
process that result in Blacks receiving harsher treatment 
than whites and innocent minority defendants being 
convicted.168 These aforementioned theories contradict the 
notion that Blacks are simply more prone to committing 
crimes. To the contrary, Blacks are more prone to being 
swept up in a criminal justice system that is, in many 
respects, hostile to and biased against them.169 “Once a 
Black person is convicted of a crime (a likely scenario 
given the current statistics), that conviction will help to 
convict him again if he is ever charged with another crime 
(another very likely outcome given the “repeat offender” 
statistics for Blacks)” under the impeachment with prior 
convictions regime.170 Rule 609 perpetuates the 
criminalization of the Black population.171 
 For the last several decades, critical race theorists 
have argued that Blacks do not receive the benefit from 
the presumption of innocence.172 Bryan Stevenson goes so 
far as to say that Black children are born with a 
presumption of guilt.173 In the few times the Supreme 
Court has used social science in its decisions, the outcome 
                                               
165 Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to be Black in the Criminal 
Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2015), 
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justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
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was quite favorable for race relations. The Supreme 
Court, in its landmark Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, cited the work of Black psychologists Kenneth 
Clark and Mamie Clark.174 Drs. Kenneth and Mamie 
Clark, a husband and wife duo, conducted a series of 
experiments known as “The Doll Test” in the 1940s.175 
Their subjects, children between the ages of three to 
seven, were asked to identify both the race of the dolls 
and which color doll they prefer.176 A majority of the 
children preferred the white doll and assigned positive 
characteristics to it.177 In an effort to leverage the 
outcome of these experiments, the Brown legal team 
relied on the testimonies and research of social scientists 
as a part of their legal strategy.178 This research proved 
fruitful when the Court held that state laws designating 
separate public schools for Black and white children were 
unconstitutional.179 The results of The Doll Test 
empirically proved that prejudice, segregation, and 
discrimination created inferiority among Black children 
and damaged their self-esteem.180 Through Brown, social 
science research remarkably contributed to one of the 
most important court decisions in twentieth-century 
America.181 
A more recent study from 2004 shows a similar 
effect to the one the Clarks discovered over sixty years 
ago, where researchers investigated the relationship 
between stereotypical associations and visual 
processing.182 Researchers primed participants with 
images of either Black or white male faces, then showed 
objects on a computer screen that were either crime 
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relevant (a gun) or irrelevant (a camera).183 The images 
were initially degraded, then slowly enhanced to discern 
what the image was.184 Researchers measured the time it 
took to identify the object based on what racial prime was 
provided at the beginning of the test.185 As expected, 
Black face primes dramatically reduced the number of 
frames needed to accurately detect crime relevant 
objects.186 In other words, when participants were primed 
with the faces of Black males, they identified crime-
related objects faster than objects not associated with 
crime.187 In the criminal context, the study proves that 
police officers also think about crime when they see Black 
people and are likely to be more attentive to them.188 And 
taking this one step further, this means the presence of 
Black people means law enforcement is more likely to be 
attentive to the possibility of crime.  
 Professor Carodine189 has noted the varieties of 
racism that exist to support the theory that criminality 
based on race is “reasonable”190:  “Negrophobia” is 
described as a form of post-traumatic stress that a person 
encounters after a traumatic experience with a Black 
person, “The Reasonable Racist” is someone who believes 
that it is reasonable to believe that Blacks are more likely 
to commit crime because other similarly situated 
Americans would believe this to be true as well, and the 
“Involuntary Negrophobe” is a person who has developed 
a phobia towards all Blacks.191 What these figures have in 
common is that they represent the various perceptions of 
Black Americans and reduce the reliability of criminal 
convictions.192 Racism is inherently unreliable.193 
 For example, social science data has proven the 
existence of crossracial impairment. Cross-racial 
identification occurs when an eyewitness is asked to 
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identify a person of another race.194 In the New Jersey 
Supreme Court case, State v. Cromedy, the victim was 
raped and robbed in her home.195 The attacker made no 
attempt to conceal his face, and the victim believed she 
saw his face clearly in the brightly lit apartment.196 
Approximately eight months later, the victim saw a Black 
male across the street who she believed was her 
attacker.197 Citing Brown v. Board of Education and 
relying on a plethora of social-science research, the court 
had to determine whether cross-racial impairment of 
eyewitnesses was a scientifically accepted fact.198 The 
court held that not only does this impairment exist, it is 
strongest when white witnesses attempt to recognize 
Black subjects.199 The court rejected the State’s contention 
that it should not require a cross-racial identification 
charge to the jury before it has been demonstrated that 
there is substantial agreement in the relevant scientific 
community to support such a charge.200 It was 
demonstrated that there was substantial agreement in 
the relevant scientific community that cross-racial 
recognition impairment exists, and that therefore Mr. 
Cromedy was entitled to a jury instruction apprising 
jurors of that fact.201 Even if there were no such 
agreement, the court concluded that empirical data 
indicated that problems with cross-racial exist as a 
matter of ordinary human experience not scientific 
knowledge.202 State v. Cromedy represents an instance 
were identification of the defendant was the critical 
issue.203 Mr. Cromedy, was wrongfully convicted even 
after the New Jersey Supreme Court remanded for a new 
trial.204 His case also represents yet another wrinkle to 
the existence of racial disparity in the criminal justice 
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system. While many scholars support the idea of 
including expert testimony to educate jurors on cross-
racial identification, few trial judges permit this.205 
Instead, special jury instructions are employed but again 
those cannot be relied upon as a safeguard for 
defendants.206 
 In lieu of these challenging perspectives, there are  
a few states trying to do it right, like Montana, Hawaii, 
and Georgia for example. In State v. Maine, the Montana 
Supreme Court diverged from United States Supreme 
Court precedent and ruled that a prior conviction cannot 
be used to increase the punishment for a subsequent 
offense if the prior conviction is tainted by any kind of 
constitutional violation.207 Indeed, a defendant whose 
sentence is enhanced based on an unreliable prior 
conviction is made to suffer punishment twice for a 
conviction that was not reliable enough to punish him the 
first time.208 Hawaii was the first state to adopt a version 
of Rule 609 that departed from the federal rule by 
disallowing the use of a prior-conviction to impeach a 
criminal defendant.209 Hawaii’s Supreme Court showed 
concern that prior convictions have little probative value 
on witness credibility and ruled such impeachment 
unconstitutional under its state constitution.210 Likewise 
in United States v. Leviner,211 Judge Nancy Gertner of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
declined to accept the presumptive weight of Mr. 
Leviner’s prior convictions for sentencing purposes and 
instead examined the circumstances of the convictions.212 
In this case specifically, the prior convictions left the 
Judge feeling concerned that the convictions had been a 
product of racial profiling.213 She sentenced the defendant 
as if these prior convictions did not exist.214 Judge 
Gertner sets the standard at the federal level for the way 
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in which prior conviction evidence should be identified 
and assessed: she refused to compound injustice.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Use of prior convictions is unreliable. The fact that 
Black people are more likely than whites to have a 
criminal record and be impeached with their prior 
convictions compounds the unreliability problem. As one 
scholar has noted, support for the disparate treatment of 
Blacks affects jury decision making and creates due 
process concerns.215 While due process is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is important to underscore that use of 
prior convictions, as proof of the defendant’s character for 
veracity, are not supported by social-science research. As 
Judge Easterbrook noted several decades ago, “[W]e do 
not pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind 
without thinking about the other.”216 
The use of prior convictions also stands on the 
assumption that the defendant’s prior conviction was 
vigorously tried the first time; thereby creating a vicious 
cycle in which it is assumed the conviction was reliable to 
begin with. This is not true for all defendants. Even 
judges possess bias.217 With the compounding amount of 
racial bias apparent in the criminal justice system, these 
assumptions must be challenged, and social science has 
and continues to do so. Study after study demonstrates 
that Blacks are more likely to be targets of crime and to 
be charged with crimes from adolescence through 
adulthood.218 How can we continue to give a neutral face 
to these inaccuracies? 
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This paper proposes that a federal task force be 
developed to address Rule 609 and the implicit bias it 
contains. Against the backdrop of historic racism, where 
racial inequality has been hardwired into our culture, 
Rule 609 needs an immediate facelift. First, Rule 
609(a)(2) makes sense to allow crimes of dishonesty to be 
automatically admissible because veracity of the witness 
in a proceeding is important. However, even with Rule 
609(a)(1)’s immediate admission of these specific 
convictions, the court should thoroughly assess the record 
to ensure—as states like Montana and Hawaii do—that 
the prior conviction is not tainted by any sort of 
constitutional violation. If so, the defense should be 
entitled to object. In regard to Rule 609 in totality, racial 
inequality in America urges a collaboration with CRT and 
the social sciences to acknowledge that race is a social 
construction whose meanings and effects change over 
time. More specifically, Congress should seek to work 
directly with social science to incorporate the work that 
social scientists have already done and use human-
centered design methods to acknowledge and reconfigure 
the rule in such a manner that fulfills its purpose: the 
administration of a fair proceeding and, ultimately, a fair 
determination. By doing so, we create the potential that 
rule drafters will respond appropriately to an ever-
evolving racial landscape, that prosecutors will think 
twice before introducing evidence of a prior conviction 
that may not have been obtained fairly, that judges will 
better screen and become introspective of their own 
prejudices, and that defendant-witnesses will hold fast to 
their defense of testifying on their own behalf without the 
dreaded fear of being impeached. A swift and urgent 
review of Rule 609 would begin to thwart the repetitious 
cycle of racism in our criminal justice system and make 
the next fight for a defendant fairer. 
Many scholars have proposed a range of options for 
Rule 609. Proposals include complete elimination of the 
rule, consideration that courts and rule drafters take a 
deeper look into prior convictions as reliable sources of 
evidence, and advocacy for a complete turn toward a 
critical race theory of evidence entirely.219 I do not believe 
                                               
219 See Montré D. Carodine, The Mis-Characterization of the Negro: A Race 
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 583-585 
 
          Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality  [7:2 
 
341 
the rule in its entirety should be eliminated, yet I do 
agree that reliance on prior convictions has gone too far. I 
believe implicit bias exists. I believe that any respected, 
ethical judge and litigator knows that it exists even if 
they do not understand its applicability to the law. 
Incidents of racism often appear in the news and at least 
64% of Americans believe racism remains a problem in 
America. 220 So, we are beyond ignorance and 
misunderstanding. As Professor Roberts has suggested, 
the place to start is with the litigators of the system.221 
My suggestion is to use the agreed-upon bias in the rule 
among evidence scholars and social scientists to create a 
platform of collaboration between legal scholars and social 
scientists in order to reassess the operation of the rules 
that present bias. If racial evidence is prohibited and 
character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove that 
a person is likely to behave a certain way, why does our 
legal system allow prior convictions against people of color 
who experience the criminal-justice system more than 
anyone else? We know that jurors use race as a proxy for 
character—and they should not. Because Rule 609 is 
considered the most controversial of them all, a task force 
to review Rule 609’s necessity with legal and CRT 
scholars, social scientists, behavioral realists, and lay 
people would certainly be a significant start.  
Professor Jerry Kang has provided a model through 
behavioral realism by which such a task force could begin 
its review of Rule 609.222 Step one involves seeking more 
accurate models of human behavior.223 This should not be 
a difficult task because, as I have discussed infra, the 
work of social scientists exists on a wide spectrum within 
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law and in many areas of the criminal justice. Step two is 
to excavate old law.224 Again, once new and accurate 
models of human behavior and implicit bias are accounted 
for in police and prosecutorial culture and training, 
courtrooms, and juries, we may see a break in behavior.225 
Step three account for the gap.226 Where there is a 
sufficiently large gap between old law and new models of 
behavior, we should pressure the law to take account.227 
As it relates to Rule 609, I have discussed the ways in 
which convictions offered for impeachment are prejudicial 
and misrepresent a defendant-witness’s veracity for 
truthfulness. Furthermore, the potential that jurors will 
use that conviction evidence improperly burdens a 
defendant’s rights to testify and proceeds under the 
assumption that the defendant’s prior conviction was 
vigorously defended, free of implicit bias, and is a reliable 
indicator of his character for truthfulness. These 
assumptions have and should be challenged. All we must 
do is wait for the criminal justice system to reflect and 
remove the seemingly insurmountable amount of racial 
bias that Black defendants face within it. Such an effort, 
to address the bias that is inherent in Rule 609, could be a 
catalyst to promote new policies around discrimination in 
legal proceedings overall to ensure that the Rules 
preserve their purpose to “administer every proceeding 
fairly” for everyone. A deeper collaboration with the social 
sciences is not just necessary, it is imperative.  
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